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Abstract
Mobile healthcare system integrating wearable sensing and wireless communication technologies continu-
ously monitors the users’ health status. However, the mHealth system raises a severe privacy concern as the data
it collects are private information, such as heart rate and blood pressure. In this paper, we propose an efficient
and privacy-preserving mHealth data release approach for the statistic data with the objectives to preserve the
unique patterns in the original data bins. The proposed approach adopts the bucket partition algorithm and the
differential privacy algorithm for privacy preservation. A customized bucket partition algorithm is proposed to
combine the database value bins into buckets according to certain conditions and parameters such that the patterns
are preserved. The differential privacy algorithm is then applied to the buckets to prevent an attacker from being
able to identify the small changes at the original data. We prove that the proposed approach achieves differential
privacy. We also show the accuracy of the proposed approach through extensive simulations on real data. Real
experiments show that our partitioning algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art in preserving the patterns of
the original data by a factor of 1.75.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mobile healthcare (mHealth) system with emerging wearable devices and wireless commu-
nications has removed geographical and distance related barriers of healthcare and has made the
This work has been presented at the IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2016
c©Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future
media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale
or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
04
57
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
2 S
ep
 20
18
continuously-collected health data available anytime and anywhere [1]–[4]. However, the mHealth
system raises a severe privacy concern to its users because the mHealth data usually contain private
information [5], such as heart rate and blood pressure, at a highly fine-grained level, which may be
maliciously used to derive patients’ sensitive information, such as daily activities and health conditions.
Keeping privacy of the data is the most important challenge of the emerging mHealth system [3], [6].
Differential Privacy (DP) [7] has been studied to help release data with privacy protection and accuracy
assurance. DP can simply be explained as the mechanism of randomizing the results of the given query
by adding some noise, commonly generated through Laplace distribution, to the original results based
on a privacy budget  to preserve the privacy of the individual records in the database. DP can guarantee
mathematically-provable and measurable privacy preservation because of its precise definition and proof
of privacy protection [8]. DP has been applied to release the data of the histogram in Fig. 1 (left) [9],
[10]. With DP, it can be guaranteed that an attacker cannot distinguish the original histogram and the
histogram with any bin plus 1 or minus 1. However, the aggregate mHealth data are much different from
histogram bins from three perspectives (shown in Fig. 1): i) The bin values usually represent real values
but not counts; ii) The bins can be generated at a high frequency, such as heart rate being continuously
monitored by wearable devices at a rate of one per minute; and iii) The bins may be interpreted with
special diagnosis needs and some particular pattern consistency is required. All these distinctive features
make the existing DP mechanisms [10], [11] inefficient when applied to the mHealth data.
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Fig. 1. Histogram and mHealth data bins
In this paper, we focus on an efficient and privacy-preserving data release approach specially designed
for the mHealth data. We observe that the pattern consistency is particularly important for the mHealth
data analysis. If the pattern of the original data is removed for the privacy concern, we consider such
privacy-preserving approach is unacceptable in the mHealth data analysis. Here, we particularly study
two pattern consistency requirements: i) if the difference of the values of two bins are larger than a
threshold, the relationship of the outputs corresponding to the two bins must be preserved; and ii) if
the difference of the values of two adjacent bins are larger than a threshold, the relationship of the
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outputs must be preserved. Naturally, the difference threshold for the adjacent bins is smaller than the
first one to distinguish between rapid and slight changes. The motivation behind these requirements is
to enable healthcare providers to observe the patients’ health conditions from the preserved patterns.
Specifically, we propose a novel differential privacy mechanism to release the aggregate query results
of the mHealth data as shown in Fig. 1 (right). To preserve the defined pattern, the DP mechanism
consists of two stages: the first stage is the private partitioning of the database bins into DP-compliant
buckets, and the second stage is the noise addition to the average value in each bucket for data release
to achieve DP. Specifically, the contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• First, we study the patterns occurring in the mHealth data and observe that there are two dis-
tinguishable patterns of “rapid change” and “slight change” in these data, which the current privacy
preserving techniques are unable to distinguish and preserve them in the final result. The slight change
is referred to the minor changes that happen over the time, while the rapid changes happen between
two adjacent data bins.
• Second, we propose an efficient and privacy-preserving mHealth data release mechanism. A new
pattern-preserving partitioning algorithm is developed to preserve the rapid changes from the slight
changes in the released data.
• Third, we prove that the proposed mechanism achieves −differential privacy. We further obtain
the accuracy analysis results through an extensive simulations using real data set. The results show that
our algorithm achieves pattern consistency while other existing mechanisms cannot.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Histogram and privacy
Histograms, are commonly used to aggregate information to represent statistical data, as shown in
Fig. 1 (left). The statistical data usually are considered to be privacy-preserving because the attacker
is unable to derive the information about a single data record. However, if the database allows the
attacker to run multiple queries on histograms without any constraints, the attacker is able to find out a
newly-added or deleted data record by simply running the same query before and after the operation.
For example, in Fig. 1 (left), the attacker queries the number of patients for all the age ranges of n and
(n+ 1) consecutive days. Then, the attacker is able to derive the age of a patient admitted on (n+ 1)-th
day, which is not intended to be disclosed.
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B. Differential privacy
Differential privacy (DP) mechanisms are recently proposed to address the above privacy problem.
The idea is to tolerate a small change in the database and prevent the attacker from being able to tell
the change. Here we detail the DP definitions.
DP places a bound (controlled by privacy budget ) on the difference in the probability of algorithm
outputs for any two neighboring databases. For any given database instance I , let nbrs(I) denote the
set of neighboring databases which differ from I in at most one record; i.e., if I ′ ∈ nbrs(I), then
|(I − I ′) ∪ (I ′ − I)| = 1.
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm A is −Differentially Private if for all instances I , any I ′ ∈
nbrs(I), and any subset of outputs S ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
Pr[A(I) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[A(I ′) ∈ S]
Definition 2 (Sensitivity of a query). Given a sequence of counting queries Q, the sensitivity of Q,
denoted as ∆Q, is:
∆Q = max||Q(I)−Q(I ′)||1
where I ′ ∈ nbrs(I).
Laplace mechanism: We use Lap(b) to denote the Laplace probability distribution with mean 0 and
scale b. The Laplace mechanism is commonly used to achieves DP by adding Laplace noise to a query
output.
Definition 3. Let Q be a query sequence of length d and Z be a d-length vector of random variables
where Zi:Lap(∆Qi/). The Laplace mechanism Q˜ is defined as:
Q˜(I) = Q(I) + Z
The randomized algorithm Q˜ is -differentially private.
Differential private algorithm has two properties.
• Sequential composition: If there are n independent algorithms A1, ...,An, whose privacy budgets are
1, ..., n respectively, any function K of them: K(A1, ...,An) is
∑n
i=1 i-differentially private.
• Parallel composition: If the previous mechanisms are computed on disjoint subsets of the private
dataset then the function K would be max{i}-differentially private.
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III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the proposed privacy-preserving data release scheme.
A. Scheme overview
The overview of our scheme is shown in Fig. 2. Consider a scenario where the user has a wearable
watch to monitor her health data continuously. The watch uploads the data to the database through
smartphones and wireless communications. The database is always updated with the latest health data.
A querier can send query to the database and obtain the statistic information about the user. However,
the responses should not disclose any single data record to the querier. There are four steps for the
query process.
Fig. 2. System Model
Step 1: Query generation: querier sends the query sequence Q to the database. The querier in this
case could be the personal healthcare provider of the user or any other party (e.g. doctor, hospital, etc.)
who needs to monitor the health conditions of the user. The sequence of queries can be average heart
rate of the users for every 10 minute of her daily life over a week or month. This query can help the
doctor to monitor the general pattern of changes in her patient’s heart rate on a very fine-grained basis.
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Step 2: Aggregate query generation: based on the queries, the database records would be aggregated
into data bins. For instance the database may contain user’s heart rate for each minute but the querier
(i.e. doctor) may only be interested in monitoring the information on a 5 minute basis. Thus the data bins
generated by the database aggregates information of 5 records into a single bin.
Step 3: DP-compliant partitioning: the bins resulted from previous step will be then partitioned into a set
of buckets based on the values of each bin, structure of the data and user defined threshold values indicating
the level of granularity required by the querier. The purpose of this partitioning is to achieve more efficiency
over answering the queries and also it is proven that coarser granularity achieved by a proper bucketing will
increase the accuracy of the randomization [10]. This process needs to use randomization which complies
with differential privacy requirements because the structure of the buckets may reveal information and due
to small changes in the database, private information in the database can be inferred. Also, because of
general nature of aggregation and randomization, the patterns in the original data will usually be removed
during this process. Our partitioning algorithm is proven to be differentially private and preserve the patterns
of the original data.
Step 4: Randomizing Algorithm: the query results of buckets from previous step will be randomized by
adding noise from Laplace distribution to preserve the privacy of the data. This step simply follows the
data-independent Laplace mechanism which adds noise to the results regardless of the inputs. Then the
results would be sent to the querier.
The first two steps are widely studied and the process suggested for them is fairly straightforward and
standard, thus we skip further details about them and focus on the last two steps especially the third step
as the main goal of this work.
B. DP-Compliant Partitioning
The partitioning of the data bins into the buckets has to be complying with differential privacy require-
ments because it has to be guaranteed that the bucketing is probabilistically the same for two neighboring
databases, in other words, adding or removing a record from the database should be tolerated through a
random variable. The process of partitioning itself follows a simple triple thresholded scheme:
1) Algorithm setup and initialization: The variable declarations and initializations should be done before
the start of the algorithm process itself. The Min,Max are non-negative numbers used to hold the values of
maximum and minimum of bins in each bucket. Integers i, j, size are used to hold the indexes of current bin,
current bucket and size of current bucket respectively. Also current is used to hold the value of previous
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bin (i.e. xi−1). Three following threshold parameters are learned from public accessible information and
are set based on user and querier’s setup:
• TD: this value bound the maximum possible difference in maximum and minimum values of a single
bucket to insure the uniformity of each bucket. (i.e. the bin values can dramatically change if this
threshold is too large.)
• TL: the maximum possible length of buckets is bounded by TL in order to evade creating over-sized
buckets.
• TR: this threshold which is naturally selected to be smaller than TD, ensures that changes in the data
are observed and differentiated from changes which generally will be captured by TD, because the
change in two adjacent bins may actually be smaller than the TD threshold but since it has happened
in a very small period of time, it has important information in it and has to be preserved and reflected
for the doctor. For instance increasing heart rate during daily activities will be distinguished from
changes during workout.
Due to the privacy requirement of the partitioning algorithm, it is necessary to randomize TD and TR
threshold parameters. Thus, using the Laplace mechanism, with privacy budget 1 we produce random
noises Y, Y ′ which will be added to TD and TR and form TˆD to TˆR respectively.
2) Partitioning process: The partitioning process is done using an efficient and simple process of scanning
from beginning of the data domain to the end (i.e. first to the last bin) with possible single backtracks during
scan. The process starts with placing the first bin into the fist bucket and continues to next bins. In case
uniformity of the bins complies with threshold requirements, the bin would be added to the same bucket,
otherwise a new bucket would be created and process continues with the new bucket. The first condition
to check is the TR threshold because of its smaller value (line 15). In case of this condition not satisfying,
two single bin buckets (each containing one of the unbalanced bins) are required to be created. Based on
the size of the current bucket, three different cases are considerable (lines 16, 27 and 31). Furthermore,
after this condition the two remaining thresholds would be examined (line 38) and based on that condition,
either a new bucket would be created or the current bucket would be enlarged. Creating new bucket is
simply done by pushing the current bucket (i.e. bj) into the result set (i.e. B) and incrementing j followed
by resetting size to 0.
C. Randomizing Algorithm
After partitioning of the data into buckets, adding noise to the average value of bins in each bucket
would simply satisfy DP as long as the added noise is generated with proper setting and noise scale. In
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Algorithm 1 Private Partitioning Algorithm
1: Input: database D, TD, TL, TR, 1
2: Output: a set of histogram buckets B
3: Initialization: Set size = 0; i = 1; j = 1, B = ∅,
4: TˆD = TD + Y, TˆR = TR + Y ′ . Y, Y ′:Lap(1/1)
5: while i ≤ length(D) do
6: current = NULL;
7: if (size == 0) then
8: bj ← xi . Put bin xi into bucket bj
9: Min =Max = current = xi;
10: current = xi; size++; i++; . Goto next bin
11: end if
12: Max = max(Max, xi);Min = min(Min, xi)
13: if (current 6= NULL and |current− xi| > TˆR) then
14: if size == 0 then
15: if (B[−1].length > 1) then
16: last = B.pop(); bj = last.pop()
17: B ← last; B ← bj ; j ++;
18: bj ← xi; B ← bj ;
19: j ++; current = xi; i++; size = 0;
20: else . Last bucket is already single bin
21: bj ← xi;B ← bj
22: j ++; current = xi; i++; size = 0;
23: end if
24: else if size == 1 then
25: B ← bj ; j ++; bj ← xi;B ← bj ; j ++;
26: current = xi; size = 0; i++
27: else if size > 1 then
28: last = bj .pop();B ← bj ; j ++;
29: bj ← last;B ⇐ bj ; j ++;
30: bj ← xi;B ← bj ; j ++;
31: current = xi; size = 0; i++
32: end if . size check
33: end if . TˆR check
34: if ((Max−Min ≤ TˆD) and (size ≤ TL) then
35: bj ← xi . Put bin xi into bucket bj
36: current = xi; size++; i++; . Goto next bin
37: else
38: B ← bj . Done with this bucket
39: current = xi; size = 0; j ++; . Goto next bucket
40: end if
41: end while
42: return B . Set of buckets
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this step we use the Laplace distribution for generating noise. Considering the maximum possible change
in values of bins in neighboring databases is α, since value of each bucket is the average value of its bins
and having buckets with the size = 1 is considerable, the Laplace scale for this step has to be b = α

for
achieving −DP.
IV. PROOF OF PRIVACY
This part shows the proof of privacy for Algorithm 1. Let d0, d1 be neighboring databases andA(d0),A(d1)
be the output of the algorithm on these databases; Maxik, and Minik be the maximum and minimum value
of bins in ith bucket bi of dk. Y and Y ′ are Laplace random variables and fy, fy′ are their density function,
therefor TˆD = TD + Y and TˆR = TR + Y ′ are the randomized threshold values. To show that the algorithm
is −differentially private, we need to show that result of partitioning of d0 and d1 are probabilistically
equivalent, thus it is sufficient to prove: Pr(A(d0) = B) ≤ e×Pr(A(d1) = B). The parameters effective
in partitioning results are the threshold values (i.e. TL, TˆD and TˆR), but TL is not a random variable, therefor
only TˆD and TˆR are effective in randomness of the result. Suppose the maximum difference in value of bins
in two neighboring databases is bounded by α. This α can be learned from public accessible data based on
the type of queries and maximum possible values for the under study filed of the record. For each bucket,
we have Maxi −Mini < TˆD and |current − xi| < TˆR. These two inequalities can be generalized to the
whole database:
Pr(A(d0) = B)
Pr(A(d1) = B) ≤ e
 ⇔ X = (
∏
bi∈d0 Pr(Maxi0 −Mini0 < TˆD)∏
bi∈d1 Pr(Maxi1 −Mini1 < TˆD)
×
∏
bi∈d0 Pr(|current− xi0| < TˆR)∏
bi∈d1 Pr(|current− xi1| < TˆR)
) ≤ e
Using the sequential composition property of DP, taking  = 1 + 2, we have:
X = (
∏
bi∈d0 Pr(Maxi0 −Mini0 < TˆD)∏
bi∈d1 Pr(Maxi1 −Mini1 < TˆD)
≤ e1)
×(
∏
bi∈d0 Pr(|current− xi0| < TˆR)∏
bi∈d1 Pr(|current− xi1| < TˆR)
) ≤ e2)
Thus if both parts of this equation holds, the algorithm is −differentially private. We try to solve these
inequalities (i.e. X1 and X2) in order to find the required Laplace distribution scale for satisfying −DP.
Suppose the changed record falls into bucket bi (ith bucket of dk). Altering d0 or d1 are equivalent, thus
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we only consider one case. For the first inequality (i.e. X1), if the changed record is between minimum and
maximum values of the bucket (i.e. Mini0 ≤ xi0 ≤Maxi0), then the Maxi0 and Mini0 will not change and
Pr(Maxi0−Mini0 < TˆD) = 1 ≤ e1 for every 1. But if the changed value effects either Maxi0 or Mini0,
we need to find the suitable Laplace scale (b = s/1) in order to have this change tolerated. The Maxi0
and Mini0 are changes by α units and to the value of the X1, increasing Mini0 is equivalent to decreasing
Maxi0 and vice versa, thus we only consider change of Maxi0. We take Y :Lap(s/1), t = Maxi0−Mini0
and u = t− TD, then we consider two cases of changing Maxi0:
1) If Maxi0 ←Maxi0 + α:
X1 = Pr(t+ α < TˆD)
Pr(t < TˆD)
=
Pr(Y > u+ α)
Pr(Z > u)
< 1 ≤ e1
2) If Maxi0 ←Maxi0 − α:
X1 = Pr(t− α < TˆD)
Pr(t < TˆD)
=
Pr(Y > u− α)
Pr(Z > u)
=
∫ +∞
u−α fy(y)dy∫ +∞
u
fy(y)dy
≤ e1
We consider following cases in order to solve the above inequality:
• u ≥ α : X1 = e1/s ≤ e1 ⇒ 1/s ≤ 1 ⇒ 1/s ≤ 1⇒ s ≥ 1
• 0 < u < α :
X1 =
1
2 +
∫ +∞
u−α fy(y)dy∫ +∞
u
fy(y)dy
=
2− eu−αb
e
−u
b
≤ e1
Taking v = e
u
b , then X1 = 2v − e−αb v2 ≤ e1 ⇒ s ≥ α
• u ≤ 0 :
X1 =
1
2 +
∫ 0
u−α fy(y)dy
1
2 +
∫ 0
u
fy(y)dy
=
2− eu−αb
2− eub ≤ e
1
⇔ e1(eu1) 1s − [e(u−α)1 ] 1s ≤ 2e1 − 2
Taking s = α, the inequality above holds. Thus for the first part of the equation (i.e. X1), the Laplace
scale b = α
1
is sufficient for DP.
For the second part (i.e. X2), we have to make sure the difference between changed record and its next
(and previous) record will be tolerated through TˆR and will not result in changing the buckets. Considering
the differences between values of consecutive bins, increasing the larger value is equivalent to decreasing
the smaller value and vice versa, thus considering only changes in one value (i.e. xi0 ← xi0 + α and
xi0 ← xi0 − α) is sufficient for the proof. We have:
X2 =
Pr(|x(i−1)0 − xi0| < TˆR)
Pr(|x(i−1)1 − xi1| < TˆR)
× Pr(|x(i+1)0 − xi0| < TˆR)
Pr(|x(i+1)1 − xi1| < TˆR)
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Also, relative change between x(i−1)1 and xi1 is equivalent to change between x(i+1)1 and xi1, thus only
considering one case is sufficient for the proof. Considering the large value in the adjacent bins as Maxi0
and the smaller vales as Minoi through the exact same argument as the argument for previous part, the
proof of privacy for s = α⇒ b = α
2
is immediate.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our newly-designed algorithm. We have conducted real
experiments on captured heart rates from wearable devices attached to a user during two weeks. Heart rate
usually ranges between 50 and 210, and thus we choose α = 160
14
as the sensitivity. Obviously, for a bigger
time period of data collection, the required Laplace scale for achieving same privacy budget gets smaller as
a result of less sensitivity due to aggregation over more data. The experiments are run on a Linux machine
with an Intel Core i7 3.5 GHz processor and 8 GB of DDR3 memory.
A. Pattern preservation evaluation
We compare our algorithm and the state-of-the-art proposed by Li el al. [9] in terms of capturing the
patterns of the original data and reflecting them in the final output. To do so we define pattern preservation
percentage as
detected rapid changes
all rapid changes in data
× 100 Our algorithm uses an additional threshold parameter
TR as maximum difference allowed for two adjacent bins to be combined into one bucket. In case this
threshold is violated, our algorithm divides the two bins into two single-bin buckets in order to emphasis
on this rapid change as opposed to Li’s algorithm which does not capture rapid changes. In our designed
experiment we used TL = 4, TD = 30 and TR = 15 for our algorithm and for Li’s algorithm we used
two settings for their TD to be as small as our TR and also same value as our TD, and have assigned the
same value for their TL as for ours. We tested both algorithms on a set of collected heart rate per minute
data stored for two weeks. Fig. 3 is a sample result of partitioning and randomizing of both algorithms.
The black arrows are rapid changes which are captured by our algorithm. The arrow marked by (1) is an
example of failing Li’s algorithm with TD = 30 in capturing the rapid change and (2) is an example in
which both Li’s algorithms fail in doing so. As shown in Fig. 4 (a) our algorithm does better than Li’s in
preserving the pattern of original data with the same TD threshold. In case of selecting Li’s TD to be as
small as our TR, obviously every rapid change in data is also captured as subset of Max −Min factor
which Li’s algorithm is focused on, thus almost (because of the randomization effect) equal preservation
percent is reasonable in this case.
The very important point is that our algorithm other than detecting the rapid change, using the idea of
creating single bin buckets at the places of rapid change is preserving the change from being smoothed
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out through the averaging in the bucket. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 4, our algorithm outperforms Li’s
(with the same TD values) in percentage of preserved rapid changes with 70.81% compared to 40.1%. As
mentioned Li’s algorithm with TD = 15 is able to perform almost equal to ours (68.36%) but may lose
the found pattern by averaging bin values over their bucket. The values are computed by averaging over
results of 1000 experiments.
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Fig. 3. Pattern preservation results based on 10 minutes query sequence
B. Error analysis
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Fig. 4. (a) Pattern preservation percentile. (b) & (c) Relative and absolute error comparison comparison
In this subsection we compare our algorithm with Li’s in terms of absolute and relative error values
in two steps and argue that preserving the pattern will result in higher accuracy (less error) because of
the structural benefit gained in our algorithm. The reason is better uniformity between bins in a bucket
which makes the averaging closest to the actual values. Obviously failing in dividing the unbalanced bin
from others will result in higher error in averaging and leads to less accuracy at the end. It is important
to mention that in the later steps of the scheme because of added significant Laplace noise (compared to
error values) drawn from the same scale in both ours and Li’s algorithms, only the errors in partitioning
step are comparable in two algorithms. As shown in Fig. 4 (b, c) our algorithm outperforms Li’s in both
absolute and relative error metrics at partitioning step.
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C. Time complexity
Due to the higher complexity of our algorithm than Li’s, also considering the efficiency of their algorithm
which does the partitioning in only one scan from the beginning to the end of the data (i.e. O(n)), a marginal
increase in time complexity is acceptable as a trade-off for more accurate pattern preservation. Specifically
our algorithm also scans the data only once, thus our algorithm has the same time complexity at Li’s.
The only overhead is in case of the TR threshold violation in which there are several cases considerable
and more computations necessary to handle the case. As average over 1000 experiments, Li’s times for
only partitioning and both steps are 0.734 ms and 1.012 ms and ours does it on 0.763 ms and 1.09 ms
respectively.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Security and privacy in eHealth data has been widely studied in the literature [4]–[6] because of the private
and sensitive nature of the date dealt with. The mechanism of mHealth [1] is a more recent extension to
eHealth for revolutionizing the healthcare systems though mobile communications and has been highly
attracted lately [12] and all privacy concerns raised in eHealth are applicable to mHelath. Our work is
specifically focused on privacy preservation in mHealth data and considers specific requirements of it due
to the sensitive nature of its data. While standard methods of secrecy hide the content of the message, covert
communication in wireless environments [13], [14] and computer networks [15], [16] hides the existence
of the communication.
Differential Privacy [7], [8], [17] is a newly emerged mechanism for private data publication with strong
mathematical proof of privacy preservation. Dwork et al. [8] introduced the Laplace mechanism (LM) for
generating noise, which is commonly used in the literature. LM uses a notion of sensitivity of the query (∆)
for finding the proper Laplace scale (b). In this work we use the same method of sensitivity and Laplace
scale.Private partitioning of histograms under differential privacy has been widely studied. Blum et al. [18]
have introduced a one-dimensional histogram, while Xiao et al. [19] have suggested a multi-dimensional one
using a wavelet-based technique. Xu et al. [11] have classified and compared different existing approaches
for histogram publishing that takes the structure of the bins into account. They have proposed two different
algorithms for publication and have stated that the granularity of the partitioning has impact on accuracy
of the results. A new partitioning algorithm achieving higher accuracy has been introduced in [10] by C.
Li et al. and the performance of their method in partitioning and update is further improved by H. Li et
al. in [9] but neither these works consider capturing the slight and rapid changes patterns in the original
data which is main goal of our work.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel private partitioning scheme for mHealth data under DP that preserves
the patterns of the original data and reflects it to the results. We gave strict privacy proof to show this
scheme is differentially private. Also through evaluation in real experiment we showed that the pattern of
the original data is mostly reflected into the final results as opposed to the current state-of-the-art which is
not able to properly detect and preserve the pattern. We showed our algorithm gains more accuracy due to
its benefit from pattern preservation. In our future work, we will explore more characteristics of mHealth
data in order to gain more utility for the querier, and specifically we will focus on different methods for
improving the accuracy of pattern preservation and the results through relative error.
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